Philosophy of Science

The criterion, associated with the philosopher Karl Popper, that a scientific claim must be testable and capable in principle of being proven wrong. It is one influential attempt to mark the boundary between science and non-science.

Every astronomical measurement carries an uncertainty — statistical scatter and systematic error — and understanding it is inseparable from the result. A number without its error bar is not yet a measurement, and disputes in astronomy are often disputes about uncertainty.

The movement to make the data, code, and methods behind a result openly available, so that science can be checked, reused, and built upon by anyone. In astronomy, with its open archives and shared surveys, it is both a philosophy and a well-developed practice.

The demand that a result stand up when others repeat the analysis on the same or new data — a cornerstone of scientific trust, and a growing concern as analyses become more complex and depend on large software pipelines.

The view that our best scientific theories describe a real world — that atoms, black holes, and dark matter are not merely convenient fictions but things that actually exist, even when they cannot be seen directly. It is the working assumption of most astronomers, and a live question in philosophy.

What counts as evidence in a science where controlled experiments are rarely possible and the universe cannot be put in a laboratory. Astronomy must infer from what it is shown — the light and particles that happen to arrive — which makes the careful weighing of evidence central.